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A social history of dishonoured cheques offers unique insights into notions of 
gentlemanliness and masculinity during the First World War by tracing Canadian 
officers’ personal interactions and financial transactions. Prosecuting cheque 
fraud by general court martial often required overseas authorities to intrude on 
private affairs of officers, thus marking the uncertain divide between military 
discipline and public scandal. Despite the idealized image of the respectable 
officer and gentleman as the epitome of financial integrity and trustworthiness, 
the boundary between reputable and disreputable behaviours proved more 
ambiguous depending on the specific social context in which an officer passed a 
worthless cheque.
Une histoire sociale des chèques sans provision jette un nouvel éclairage sur les 
notions de gentleman et de masculinité durant la Première Guerre mondiale par 
le biais des interactions personnelles et des transactions financières des officiers 
canadiens. Les poursuites pour fraude par chèque par la cour martiale générale 
exigeaient souvent des autorités outre-mer qu’elles s’immiscent dans les affaires 
privées des officiers et, donc, qu’elles fassent la part – pas toujours claire – entre 
discipline militaire et scandale public. Malgré la représentation idéalisée de 
l’officier respectable et du gentleman, en qui on voyait des modèles d’intégrité 
financière et de fiabilité, il existait un certain flou entre comportement honorable 
et comportement déshonorant, selon le contexte social précis dans lequel l’officier 
avait fait un chèque sans fonds.
* Matthew Barrett is a PhD candidate in the department of History at Queen’s University. Earlier drafts 
of this article benefited from the feedback of Jane Errington and Allan English, as well as the insightful 
comments of the two anonymous reviewers. The author would like to acknowledge that the research for 
this article was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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Strange that one who, sooner than do honest work, will sell his honor for a bottle 
of wine, a visit to the theatre, and an hour with a strange woman, all obtained by 
passing a worthless cheque, could yet stake his life on the most desperate chances 
of the battle-field!
George Bernard Shaw, “Yahoo and the Angry Ape” (1919)1
IN A LONDON HOTEL room on the morning of August 22, 1918, Lieutenant 
Eric Fowlds of the 1st Canadian Reserve Battalion gave Miss M. Hamilton a £5 
cheque “for services rendered and in fulfilment of an implied promise.”2 Hamilton 
had mentioned the price as an “understood thing” while the pair drank the night 
before, but she had left it up to him to pay or not. When Hamilton presented the 
officer’s cheque to the London branch of the Bank of Montreal, the teller refused 
it for insufficient funds. Fowlds, who had served ten months on the western front 
and had received a commission only two weeks earlier, attributed his error in 
signing the bad cheque to the nervous effects of shell shock. While he denied 
making any formal assurance to pay £5—just over one-fifth of a lieutenant’s 
monthly earnings—he admitted, “I did not expect to have the night with Miss 
Hamilton for nothing. I knew I should have to pay her something.”3 On November 
3, 1918, Fowlds, a twenty-three-year-old civil engineer from Hastings, Ontario, 
faced a general court martial for behaving in a scandalous manner unbecoming an 
officer and a gentleman, not for paying a woman for sex but for failing to honour 
a promise to pay. 
“I am aware of the utter caddishness of the act,” Fowlds acknowledged in a 
letter to the military police, “and can only offer to square the cheque and make 
my deepest apologies for the insult to the service.”4 The insult had not been 
an illicit relationship with an English woman; it had been the disrepute caused 
to the army when one of its officers defrauded a civilian with a false cheque. 
Given the ambiguity over the actual promise to pay, as well as Fowlds’ eventual 
restitution to Hamilton, the court martial board found him not guilty. The case 
neatly illustrates how Canadian overseas authorities prioritized prosecutions for 
financial misconduct over charges of individual sexual immorality during the First 
World War. The private liaisons of a Canadian officer with an English woman in 
a hotel did not threaten to embarrass the dignity of the army or cause a public 
scandal. If, however, the officer defrauded the woman or paid for the room with a 
worthless cheque, then military justice intervened.
1 George Bernard Shaw, Heartbreak House, Great Catherine, and Playlets of the War (New York: Brentano’s, 
1919), p. xxxviii.
2 In her initial statement, Hamilton claimed the cheque had paid “for services rendered, which were of an 
immoral character.” Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), RG 150, reel T-8693, file 602-6-176, 
Court Martial of Lieutenant Fowlds. 
3 Court Martial of Lieutenant Fowlds. Five pounds in 1917 equaled about $23.50 CAD, which adjusted for 
inflation would amount to $396 CAD in 2018. Bank of Canada Inflation calculator, accessed July 20, 2018, 
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/rates/related/inflation-calculator.
4 LAC, RG 24, reel T-17684, file 602-6-176, Lieutenant Fowlds to Assistant Provost Marshal, n.d. [1918].
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Upon receiving a commission in the Canadian Expeditionary Force 
(CEF), a man assumed the expected rights and responsibilities of an officer 
and a gentleman.5 According to official regulations and the values espoused 
by the military institution, financial integrity formed an integral component of 
this elevated social status, especially for men stationed in England. Canadian 
Headquarters and the Pay Office in London opened bank accounts for officers 
to receive their military pay, which granted each access to a chequebook. By the 
early twentieth century in Britain, cheques had become a popular and fashionable 
form of payment.6 During the First World War, Canadian officers, like their British 
counterparts, issued cheques to settle regimental mess bills, in payment for goods 
and services from civilians, and in exchange for cash at hotels and banks. 
The value of a cheque depended on a sufficient amount of money in the 
issuer’s bank account; but the perceived value and legitimacy of a cheque also 
depended on the good character and honest reputation of the issuer. Upon being 
granted a commission in the Royal Flying Corps, Second Lieutenant William 
Barker explained to his mother, “I am an officer now ... my cheque is good 
anyplace.”7 The very term “dishonoured” for a cheque refused at a bank due to 
insufficient funds pointed to the significance that British and Canadian culture 
placed on personal honour when conducting financial transactions. Business 
practices and commercial agreements depended on fundamental expectations 
for honesty, reliability, and respectability on behalf of all parties.8 One English 
banker felt “particularly aggrieved” after a Canadian captain failed to pay a debt, 
lamenting, “I felt entitled to rely on his word of honour.”9 
While determining the exact scale of the cheque problem is impractical, a 
sense can be estimated from certain partial sources. Fifty-one CEF general courts 
martial cited 187 individual worthless cheques subject to prosecution, militia 
department files indicated that dozens more officers wrote bad cheques but were 
not formally charged, and bank reports noted at least several hundred cheques 
dishonoured by Canadians per month in England and France. Over the course 
of the war, 22,843 CEF officers served overseas with another 3,323 stationed in 
Canada.10 With each officer likely to issue multiple cheques in a single month, it 
5 Desmond Morton, When Your Number’s Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First World War (Toronto: 
Random House, 1993), pp. 95-96; and Craig Leslie Mantle, “Stripes, Pips and Crowns: A Preliminary 
Study of Leader-Follower Relations in the Canadian Expeditionary Force during the First World War, 
1914-1918” (PhD diss., University of Calgary, 2013), p. 178.
6 Martin Horn, Britain, France, and the Financing of the First World War (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2002), p. 91.
7 Quoted in Wayne Ralph, Barker VC: William Barker, Canada’s Most Decorated War Hero (Toronto: 
Doubleday Canada, 1997), p. 33.
8 Sarah Wilson, “In Defence of Respectability: Financial Crime, the ‘High Art’ Criminal and the Language 
of the Courtroom 1850-1880,” in Ian Inkster, Colin Griffin, Judith Rowbotham, eds., The Golden Age: 
Essays in British Social and Economic History 1850-1870 (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 199-215; 
Andrew Holman, Sense of Their Duty: Middle-Class Formation in Victorian Ontario Towns (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), pp. 58, 119-120; Sarah Wilson, The Origins of Modern Financial 
Crime: Historical Foundations and Current Problems in Britain (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 76-79, 
178-80; and James Taylor, Boardroom Scandal: The Criminalization of Company Fraud in Nineteenth-
Century Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 1-2, 231-232.
9 LAC, RG 24, reel T-17701, file 649-P-459, James Lamb to Secretary, Militia Council, June 10, 1918. 
10 LAC, RG 38, vol. 443, Country of Birth, CEF.
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is probable that the cumulative total extended into the millions by the end of the 
war. Although the recorded number of dishonoured cheques may have amounted 
to only a fraction of all cheques issued by Canadian officers, military authorities 
nevertheless identified individual breaches as serious concerns that demanded 
specific administrative, disciplinary, and legal responses. The perception of 
widespread frauds against army paymasters and civilian creditors combined with 
the public nature of the infractions imperiled the reputation of the entire CEF.
For newly arrived Canadians, largely strangers to local English people, the 
pips or crowns on officers’ uniforms added to their apparent trustworthiness as 
clients. When Lieutenant F. R. Brown of the Royal Canadian Dragoons exchanged 
a £5 cheque at the Old Ship Hotel in Brighton, the manager reasoned, “Naturally 
being an Officer I did not doubt that it would be paid.”11 It was the third of at 
least ten cheques Brown dishonoured in a six-month period. Convicted of conduct 
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, Brown was sentenced to be cashiered, 
which expelled him from the army through a degrading ritual. Significantly, 
dishonoured cheques accounted for half of all Canadian officers cashiered by 
general court martial during the war.12 The use of military prosecution illustrated 
how overseas authorities prioritized deterrence and punishment for cheque fraud. 
The penalty of disgraceful dismissal further reflected the army’s effort to regulate 
the type of man seen as worthy to hold a commission. 
A social history of dishonoured cheques offers unique insights into notions of 
gentlemanliness and masculinity during the First World War by tracing Canadian 
officers’ spending habits, personal interactions, and financial transactions. Legal 
and disciplinary responses to the unpaid-cheques problem raised important 
questions about the reach of military justice into an accused’s social life and the 
extent to which officers expected privacy when conducting what were essentially 
personal exchanges with civilians. That some men still risked disciplinary action 
by overdrawing their bank accounts pointed to the importance of an affluent 
appearance and public performance in the affirmation of an officer’s masculine 
identity. Illicit transactions that involved women or gambling further indicated 
alternative ways that officers expressed their masculinity quite distinct from fiscal 
caution. 
Examining officers’ dishonoured cheques provides historians with the 
opportunity to explore the boundaries of acceptable forms of gentlemanliness. 
Perceptions of what exactly constituted ungentlemanly and scandalous conduct 
exposed the contradictions that underpinned divergent codes of masculinity. 
Whereas one model praised the prudent gentleman who exhibited fiscal restraint, 
another model prized the dashing gentleman who indulged in generous spending 
and risk-taking. As Mike Huggins has emphasized, the difference between 
behaviours deemed reputable and disreputable very much depended on specific 
11 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8692., file 338-20-71, Court Martial of Lieutenant Brown.
12 Officers charged in England appeared before a general court martial, which consisted of a president holding 
the rank of colonel or brigadier-general and a nine board members who each held a rank between captain 
and lieutenant-colonel.
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social contexts.13 During the First World War, official responses to the stubborn 
problem of financial misbehaviour within the army reflected the specific context 
and circumstances in which an officer issued a worthless cheque. In England, 
military authorities prioritized severe sentences against officers who dishonoured 
cheques, whether with military personnel or civilians, whereas in France field 
commanders adopted more lenient strategies that aimed to retain otherwise 
valuable fighters. Despite the idealized image of an officer and a gentleman as 
the epitome of financial integrity and trustworthiness, the limits of acceptable 
gentlemanly conduct proved less certain and more flexible in the wartime context 
than espoused military values and official fiscal regulations appeared to suggest.
Army Pay and Dishonoured Cheques
The practice of dishonouring cheques represented a serious financial crime as 
well as a subversion of military discipline and proper officer etiquette. One judge 
advocate summarized the fundamental legal and financial agreement between an 
issuer and a receiver: “In law, a cheque represents an order for cash payable on 
demand & so, normally & unless other definite arrangements had been made, 
should be able to be exchanged for cash, by the Bank drawn on, immediately after 
drawing.”14 Military authorities were less concerned with the amounts of money 
involved than with how each breach of trust “reflects on the honour and integrity 
of all Canadian Officers.”15 An integrated financial system of cheques and credit 
that involved the interests of bankers, army paymasters, and civilian creditors, 
meant that even relatively few examples of negligence and fraudulence risked 
turning private transactions into public scandals.16
Cheques were integral to the army pay of officers. Canadian officers serving 
overseas had their monthly pay deposited to their credit in accounts opened at the 
London branch of the Bank of Montreal at Waterloo Place, Pall Mall. Upon being 
appointed to a commissioned rank, officers received a chequebook and a $250 
CAD outfit allowance to purchase a uniform, kit, and equipment. Including daily 
pay, field allowance, and messing, at the end of a thirty-day month, a lieutenant 
earned approximately £23, or $108 CAD.17 Emphasizing the significant privilege 
to issue cheques, a captain stressed in his role as court martial prosecutor, “As an 
officer with a bank account he accepts a responsibility, he has a standard set for 
him whereby he must exercise caution and attention to his business affairs.”18 
13 Mike Huggins, Vice and the Victorians (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), pp. 173-175; and Mike Huggins and 
J. A. Mangan, eds., Disreputable Pleasures: Less Virtuous Victorians at Play (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 
p. xiv.
14 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8662, file 649-G-118, Court Martial of Lieutenant Green.
15 LAC, RG 9 III-B-1-7, vol. 1484, file D-57-7, Adjutant-General, OMFC, November 20, 1917.
16 In a civil court of law, knowingly dishonouring a cheque in exchange for cash could be prosecuted as 
obtaining money under false pretences. Under the Larceny Act of 1916, conviction on the misdemeanor of 
false pretences in Britain carried a sentence of penal servitude not exceeding five years.
17 Adjusted for inflation, $108 CAD in 1917 would amount to approximately $1,823 CAD in 2018. Bank of 
Canada Inflation calculator. Additionally, some officers from affluent families received money cabled from 
home to supplement military pay, while others with dependants could assign part of their pay to their wives 
or mothers.
18 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8696, 5585-1, Court Martial of Captain Ross.
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Figure 1: Waterloo Place Branch 1914-1918, painting by Oscar de Lall, 1965.
Source: Courtesy of the BMO Financial Group Corporate Archives, #P1350
When a creditor presented a cheque to the bank, a clerk checked a ledger to 
ensure that the issuing officer had enough credit to his account and verified the 
correct signature by comparison with a specimen provided upon the opening of 
the account. If the clerk discovered that an account did not have sufficient funds or 
that the signature did not match, the bank marked the cheque “R/D,” or return to 
drawer. Dishonoured cheques came to the attention of military authorities through 
various channels including regimental paymasters, the assistant provost marshal, 
civilian creditors themselves, or records submitted by the bank. When the bank 
reported a failed transaction to army officials, the investigating commanding 
officer contacted creditors to ask if each wished to forward the cheques in order to 
build a case for prosecution through general court martial. One Canadian reserve 
battalion colonel clarified, “They will not be asked to complain, as this would 
make it appear that the prosecution was trying to heap up trouble for the marginally 
noted Officer.”19 By 1918 complainants filled out the necessary details including 
cheque number, date, place, and amount on a standard form, which concluded 
with the statement, “Being the cheque of a Canadian Officer in uniform, I had no 
reason to believe but that it would be honoured on presentation.”20 Officer status 
thus served as explicit proof for trustworthiness and good credit.
Of fifty-one general courts martial for dishonoured cheques in the CEF between 
1915 and 1919, 45.1% resulted in cashiering, 17.6% in dismissal, 25.5% in severe 
reprimand and/or loss of seniority, and 11.8% in not guilty.21 The large majority 
19 LAC, RG 24, reel T-17672, file 602-2-413, GOC, Bramshott to Secretary, Canadian Headquarters, March 
20, 1918.
20 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8693, file 602-2-413, Court Martial of Lieutenant Beaumont.
21 From a broader disciplinary perspective, over 500 general courts martial in England and Europe resulted 
in a total of 175 CEF officers sentenced to dismissal or cashiering. Over one-fifth had been convicted 
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of Canadians charged for bad cheques were lieutenants; only 15% were captains 
or higher ranks. Approximately one-third of officers charged for the offence 
had been commissioned from the ranks while overseas.22 On average, Canadian 
officers sentenced to cashiering or dismissal had dishonoured four cheques for 
an approximate total of £30. Those who received lesser penalties or acquittal had 
dishonoured an average of three cheques for about £15.23 Authorities tended to try 
cases with the best chances for conviction and usually targeted habitual offenders. 
Given the hundreds of reported false cheques and the significant attention Canadian 
Headquarters devoted to the issue, the total number of courts martial represented 
only a portion of the offenders. As 70% of guilty verdicts resulted in the expulsion 
of the accused officer from the army, the application of military justice needed to 
be handled strategically. Trying, and possibly cashiering or dismissing, every man 
who committed financial infractions could have depleted the pool of officers. 
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman
In general courts martial for worthless cheques, the prosecution laid a primary 
charge under Section 16 of the Army Act for behaving in a “scandalous manner, 
unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman.”24 Tracing the evolving 
meaning of the phrase “conduct unbecoming” from its earliest usage in the 
eighteenth-century British Army, historian Arthur Gilbert notes, “By keeping it 
vague and indefinite, the charge remained flexible enough to change as ideas of 
honour changed.”25 Historically, conduct unbecoming in the military encompassed 
various dishonourable actions including abusing subordinates, sexual indecency, 
and disgraceful behaviour in public, but by the early twentieth century the charge 
predominantly concerned financial misconduct. Based on 181 individual charges 
framed under Section 16 against Canadian officers during the war, 85.6% were 
for dishonoured cheques, 11.1% were for sexual indecency and 1.1% each were 
for self-inflicted wounding, striking soldiers, and swearing. The trend within the 
military reflected the civil situation in which white-collar crime and professional 
fraudulence began receiving greater attention from legislative and judicial powers 
through the late nineteenth century.26 
Conviction under Section 16 could only result in a sentence of cashiering, 
which stripped the officer of his commission, deprived him of monetary gratuities 
for issuing worthless cheques, and because conviction typically fell under the primary charge of Section 
16, bad cheques caused 23 of 49 cashiering sentences. For comparison, among all CEF officers serving 
overseas, 2,175 were discharged as medically unfit, 2,281 were administratively discharged or resigned, 
and 2,901 died. See LAC, RG 38, vol. 442, Disposition of Discharge.
22 This proportion roughly equaled the total number of officers promoted overseas versus appointed. Of 
22,843 total CEF officers who served overseas, 7,404 were commissioned from the ranks; over three 
quarters in England and the remainder in the field. See LAC, RG 38, vol. 443, Other Ranks Who Received 
Commissions in the CEF. 
23 Thirty pounds in 1917 equaled $141 CAD, which adjusted for inflation would amount to $2,380 CAD in 
2018. See Bank of Canada Inflation calculator. 
24 War Office, Manual of Military Law (London: HMSO, 1907), p. 283.
25 Arthur Gilbert, “Law and Honour among Eighteenth-Century British Army Officers,” The Historical 
Journal, vol. 19, no.1 (1976): p. 76.
26 George Robb, White-Collar Crime in Modern England: Financial Fraud and Business Morality, 1845-
1929 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 2-5.
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and medals, and barred him from ever serving the crown in either a military 
or civil capacity. Charge sheets typically included an alternative under Section 
40, negligent conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline. 
Conviction on the primary charge required the prosecution to prove that the 
officer had issued a cheque “well knowing” he did not have sufficient funds in his 
bank account. Guilt on the lesser alternative depended on the offender having “no 
reasonable grounds in supposing the cheque would be honoured.”27 In the latter 
case, ignorance of a bank balance might cause a careless error but the former 
proved that the issuer had consciously deceived the receiver. The alternative 
charge gave the court greater flexibility in sentencing. Lesser penalties under 
Section 40 included severe reprimand, loss of rank seniority, and dismissal from 
His Majesty’s service.28
During one court martial against a Canadian officer accused of dishonouring 
cheques with a hotel and a bank, defence counsel unsuccessfully objected to the 
legality of charges under Section 16. Counsel argued, “This offence is of a social 
character more than military ... for the offence is not cowardice or feigning disease 
or purposely injuring himself, etc.”29 The Manual of Military Law, the guidebook 
to Army Act rules and regulations, specified that Section 16 in fact included 
offences of a social nature when the misconduct also reflected on an accused’s 
military character through publicity and scandal.30 As one judge advocate pointed 
out in the court martial of another officer convicted for dishonouring cheques with 
civilians, “the charges are purely military ones,” and emphasized that the section 
was “framed definitely to purge from the service any officer who by his conduct 
brings discredit & obloquy on his service.”31
Influenced by aristocratic presumptions of wealth and social club taboos, 
British military tradition regarded unpaid debts as an embarrassing violation of 
military custom and law because it undermined a gentlemanly code of honour 
based on implicit trust.32 Indebtedness itself was not incompatible with upper- 
and middle-class values. Indeed the ability to translate social status into credit 
significantly advantaged men with perceived honourable reputations.33 For a 
system of debt and credit to sustain financial arrangements, assurances to pay 
needed to be backed by actual funds; not just the appearance of affluence. In the 
prewar regular British Army, by signing a worthless cheque to settle a mess bill or 
in repayment of a loan from a peer, a professional officer ostensibly supported by 
private means had disgraced himself in the eyes of brother officers and discredited 
27 Charges for dishonoured cheques under Section 40 represented a rare legal situation where the burden of 
proof technically rested on the accused to establish he had issued cheques in good faith. 
28 Dismissal differed from cashiering in that the ex-officer could re-enlist in the ranks.
29 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8693, file 602-14-92, Court Martial Lieutenant Nobert. 
30 Manual of Military Law, p. 283.
31 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8693, file 602-16-15, Court Martial of Lieutenant Proctor.
32 Alan James Guy, Oeconomy and Discipline: Officership and Administration in the British Army, 1714-
1763 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), p. 99; and Margot C. Finn, The Character of 
Credit: Personal Debt in English Culture, 1740-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
pp. 25-26.
33 For a broader analysis of the connection between debt and honour, see David Graeber, Debt: The First 
5,000 Years (New York: Melville House, 2011), pp. 165-210. 
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his regiment by betraying a fundamental trust. While financial impropriety had 
long been a disciplinary concern in the prewar army, the experience of the First 
World War provoked even wider controversy surrounding the unprecedented 
number of cheques issued by a mass army of officers on the home front. A sample 
of British army general courts martial from November 1915 until May 1917 
identifies at least seventy-five British officers charged for dishonouring cheques, 
which represented over three-quarters of all charges laid under Section 16 during 
that period.34
One English magazine insisted such practices never happened in the old army, 
“but to-day when you have at a rough estimate, between one and two hundred 
thousand officers drawn from all classes of society, some of them possessing 
cheque-books for the first time in their lives ... well, accidents happen.”35 The 
growing membership of the British Army and the dominion forces over the course 
of the First World War expanded the social and economic composition of the 
officer corps. The temporary commission held by nonprofessional army officers 
gave rise to the term “temporary gentlemen,” which described the peculiar social 
status of civilian volunteers within a regimental culture.36 While upper-class 
officers possessed independent means and officers from wealthy families could 
receive additional funds from home, less financially secure temporary gentlemen 
and men promoted from the ranks relied on military pay as their main source 
of income. Regardless of financial experience and banking knowledge, newly 
commissioned officers were still expected to follow the prescribed etiquette of 
fiscally responsible and self-reliant gentlemen.37
Despite the model of trustworthiness and the sense of noblesse oblige 
endorsed by generals and judge advocates, the gentlemanly status bestowed on 
commissioned officers was no guarantee of financial probity. On the contrary, 
the character of the roguish gentleman-scoundrel embodied a competing version 
of manliness distinct from that of the honest and restrained gentleman.38 Upon 
appointment to the commissioned ranks some men interpreted calls to behave like 
gentlemen as an invitation to engage in generous spending and risk-taking. Turn-
of-the-century middle-class advice manuals warned boys to avoid the pitfalls of 
caddish sexuality and financial excess but the perceived need for prudent guidance 
pointed to the allure of a fashionable lifestyle.39 Young officers in particular 
34 The National Archives (hereafter TNA), WO 92/3, Judge Advocate General’s Office, General Courts 
Martial Registers, Confirmed at Home. Cashiered (34.6%); Dismissed (17.3%); loss of seniority or severe 
reprimand (33.3%); not guilty (14.6%).
35 Centurion, “The APM Again,” Land & Water, vol. LXIX, no. 2885 (August 23, 1917): p. 11. 
36 Martin Petter, “‘Temporary Gentlemen’ in the Aftermath of the Great War: Rank, Status and the Ex-Officer 
Problem,” The Historical Journal, vol. 37, no. 1 (1994): p. 151.
37 Gary Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British 
Army in the Era of the First World War (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 56.
38 The 1911 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica highlighted the subjective meaning of the term: “For ‘to 
behave like a gentleman’ may mean little or much, according to the person by whom the phrase is used; ‘to 
spend money like a gentleman’ may even be no great praise.” Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th ed. (1911), 
s.v. “Gentlemen,” by Walter Alison Philips.
39 Brent Shannon, The Cut of His Coat: Men, Dress, and Consumer Culture in Britain, 1860–1914 (Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 2006), pp. 144-159.
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navigated the contradictory obligations of thrift and self-denial with the cultural 
expectations of masculine self-confidence and virility.
Older leaders expected that young men would indulge in some excess 
and believed that a degree of boyish adventurism signified a vital capacity for 
aggression and nerve on the battlefield.40 In A General’s Letters to his Son on 
Obtaining his Commission (1917), British Army General Thomas Pilcher observed 
that “the young must have their fling, and this in ordinary times must be forgiven 
as long as a man never does anything that is ungentlemanly.”41 His commentary 
reflected a popular belief that vigorous boys enjoyed a fairly wild youth in order to 
develop into responsible, mature adults. A certain amount of risky self-indulgence 
in early manhood made self-restraint in later years all the more meaningful.42 The 
wartime situation, however, created competing pressures for youthful diversions 
to be directed away from entertainment and frivolity toward more productive and 
serious pursuits.43 Concerned about the erosion of morale and decency on the home 
front, Pilcher pointed to the moral dimensions of financial ruin on young officers 
when he warned, “I have known hundreds who have gone under on account of 
gambling, of women, or of drinking; and I will warrant that, in nine cases out 
of ten, one of these causes was at the bottom of the dishonoured cheque.”44 The 
public exposure caused by financial irresponsibility suggested to some generals 
and social commentators that offenders not only lacked discretion but that they 
also failed to take the war seriously.
Canadian Officers and Disciplinary Action
Commenting on the amateur status of the CEF in contrast to the regular British 
Army, medical officer Andrew Macphail remarked, “A Canadian officer is really 
a play-actor. He is playing a part, and ... endeavouring to present the part of an 
English gentleman.”45 Attempts to emulate a gentlemanly ideal by manners and 
appearance exposed the contradictory social and financial assumptions at the root 
of this masculine performance. The potential to assert financial agency through 
either meticulous saving or stylish spending formed competing impulses in an 
officer’s effort to live up to his rank. Most CEF officers came from middle-class 
backgrounds and worked in professional or clerical fields. Due to attrition on the 
front, by the later stages of the war officers increasingly rose from the ordinary 
ranks though the majority listed white-collar occupations on attestation forms.46
40 Mark Moss, Manliness and Militarism: Educating Young Boys in Ontario for War (Toronto: University of 
Toronto, 2001), pp. 50-51; Graham Dawson, Soldier Heroes: British Adventure, Empire and the Imagining 
of Masculinities (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 1-4; and Michael Paris, Warrior Nation: Images of War in 
British Popular Culture, 1850-2000 (London: Reaktion Books, 2000), p. 44.
41 [Thomas Pilcher], A General’s Letters to His Son on Obtaining his Commission (London: Cassell and 
Company, Ltd, 1917), p. 15. As a long-serving officer with postings in Africa and India, Pilcher could draw 
on personal experience when discussing the various temptations of army life. During the First World War, 
he had commanded a division on the western front until his sacking for inefficiency during the Battle of the 
Somme.
42 Moss, Manliness and Militarism, p. 136.
43 George Robb, British Culture and the First World War (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 160.
44 [Pilcher], A General’s Letters to His Son, p. 79.
45 LAC, MG 30 D 150, vol. 4, Macphail Diary, February 12, 1915.
46 Seventy-four per cent of all CEF officers were professionals, clerks, civil servants, merchants and students. 
311
Many middle-class Canadian men eager to take advantage of the benefits 
and prestige traditionally associated with a commissioned rank expected that the 
financial independence offered by a chequebook would confirm their elevated 
status. Unlike privates who needed to present a paybook to a regimental paymaster 
in order to receive money, one captain recalled, “Officers never had to turn their 
hands over to get theirs.”47 The ability to write cheques offered greater financial 
autonomy and flexibility while stationed in England, but as Captain Leslie Frost 
appreciated, “Living is naturally very expensive here if one is not careful. ‘Pounds’ 
seem like ‘dollars’ and the worst part of it is that they are not like dollars when 
pay day comes around.”48 His brother, Lieutenant Cecil Frost, similarly explained, 
“as an officer you simply have to pay up wherever you go. I haven’t wasted my 
money on anybody else like many have done over here.”49 While the Frost brothers 
emphasized meticulous money management in their letters home, men who had 
never held a bank account or chequebook could easily overextend themselves 
“living in the whirl of London life” due to carelessness and excessive spending.50 
As new infantry battalions arrived in England and the Canadian training 
division formed at Shorncliffe army camp near Folkestone in spring 1915, larger 
numbers of officers had come into contact with local English businesses and 
civilians. A Folkestone alderman did not consider the “whole of the Canadian 
officers dishonourable men,” but he cited the example of one local shopkeeper 
who had been defrauded by seven Canadians in November 1915 to call for action 
regarding worthless cheques.51 If military authorities did not put an end to the 
problem, English bankers, merchants, and other service providers might come 
to doubt the honour and honesty of every Canadian officer. Major-General J. C. 
MacDougall, commanding officer of the training division at Shorncliffe, warned 
that the practice “reflects very adversely on Canadian Officers generally,” while 
Colonel John W. Carson, special overseas representative of the militia minister, 
felt the issue “has been the source of annoyance and humiliation to us.”52 
Carson had a personal interest in the problem after his intervention in the 
case of Lieutenant Peter Lyall, the twenty-two-year-old son of a close friend from 
Montreal. Invalided to England after the Second Battle of Ypres in April 1915, 
Lyall went absent without leave on a spending spree, which prompted Carson 
Of the total number of officers, 3.6% were bank clerks. See LAC, RG 38, vol. 444. CEF Occupations. 
By comparison, 63% of CEF officers commissioned from the ranks overseas were professionals, clerks, 
civil servants, merchants and students. See LAC, RG 38, 443, Occupations of Other Ranks Who Gained 
Commissions.
47 H. W. McBride, A Rifleman Went to War (Plantersville, SC: Small-Arrns Technical Publishing Company, 
1935), p. 28.
48 R. B. Fleming, ed., The Wartime Letters of Leslie and Cecil Frost, 1915-1919 (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, 2007), p. 129. Based on 1917 exchange rates, £1 equalled approximately $4.70 
CAD, which adjusted for inflation would amount to $79 CAD in 2018. See Bank of Canada Inflation 
calculator.
49 Fleming, The Wartime Letters, p. 131. Emphasis in original.
50 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8691, file 332-24-50, Court Martial of Lieutenant Rankin.
51 Folkestone, Hythe, Sandgate & Cheriton Herald, December 18, 1915, p. 6
52 LAC, RG 9 III-A-1, vol. 2, file 2-1-10, Colonel Spry to Officers Commanding Canadian Units, March 
4, 1916; and LAC, RG 9 III-A-1, vol. 2, file 2-1-10, Colonel Carson to Major-General MacDougall, 
March 11, 1916.
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to warn him, “not paying one’s bills is the quickest way of getting into trouble 
with military authorities.”53 Unable to locate Lyall for months Carson traced the 
wayward lieutenant through his bad cheques issued to English hotels. Although 
Carson recognized that his efforts to conceal the transgressions “from a military 
standpoint, is absolutely and altogether wrong,” he hoped to protect the young 
lieutenant’s family from public scandal. Carson wrote to Lyall’s father, “I very 
much feared that the severe wounds which he received in France must have, to 
a certain extent, unbalanced the boy’s mind as I could not imagine that any sane 
person could act in such an absolutely crazy way.”54 After Lyall was found and 
sent home in October 1915, his father thanked Carson, writing, “I really believe 
if I had been in your place I would have had him arrested which he deserved.”55 
The publicity surrounding officers’ dishonoured cheques ensured that not every 
instance could be concealed through the influence of well-connected military 
leaders.
As financial transgressions gained greater notoriety among English civilians 
and the press, Canadian officers who wrote bad cheques became subject to the 
military justice system as part of a deterrence strategy to set disciplinary examples. 
Regarded by the Bank of Montreal as “among the worst offenders,” Major G. L. 
Cockburn of the Canadian Army Medical Corps became the first Canadian officer 
court martialled for the offence in England when charged with dishonouring five 
cheques at hotels in Swindon and Folkestone between February and April 1915.56 
The prosecutor argued forcefully, “These charges are about the most serious in 
the criminal calendar. In similar cases, when dealt with by Civil Authorities, the 
severest penalties are always imposed upon the offenders when found guilty.”57 
For instance, ex-Lieutenant E. S. Bowden-Smart, a British Columbia officer who 
had resigned his commission shortly after the First Contingent disembarked, 
received a six-month prison sentence from an English civil court in April 1915 for 
obtaining money under false pretences and impersonating an English Lord.58 The 
prosecutor against Cockburn added, “If this crime is so serious from a civil point 
of view it is still more serious [when] looked at from the military point of view, 
because actions like this ... bring discredit upon the uniform which he wears.”59 
The defence counsel successfully argued that Cockburn had been unaware of his 
bank account balance due to confusion over the date of his promotion. The not 
guilty verdict in July 1915 pointed to the need for an official military policy “to 
stamp out such conduct.”60
53 LAC, RG 9 III-A-1, vol. 169, file 6-L-5, Colonel Carson to Lieutenant Lyall, July 26, 1915.
54 LAC, RG 9 III-A-1, vol. 169, file 6-L-5, Colonel Carson to William Lyall, September 23, 1915.
55 LAC, RG 9 III-A-1, vol. 169, file 6-L-5, William Lyall to Colonel Carson, October 12, 1915.
56 LAC, RG 9 III-B-1, vol. 3029, file C-105-34, D. W. Oliver to Captain A. E. Shaw, April 14, 1915.
57 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8691, file 7-99-23, Court Martial of Major Cockburn.
58 “Said He Was Lord Glentworth,” Birmingham Mail, March 31, 1915, p. 3.
59 In comments that needed to be struck from the trial transcript for being beyond the scope of the charges, 
the prosecutor further observed that the offence had become “too frequent” and brought “discredit upon 
the fair name of the Dominion.” See LAC, RG 150, reel T-8691, file 7-99-23, Court Martial of Major 
Cockburn. One year after the trial Cockburn resigned his commission at his own request in August 1916.
60 Court Martial of Major Cockburn.
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Figure 2: Two-pound cheque signed by Major G. L. Cockburn, April 1, 1915.
Source: LAC, RG 150, reel T-8691, file 7-99-23.
By early 1916, the Bank of Montreal estimated it had refused between four 
and five hundred bad cheques per month.61 While the total number represented 
a small proportion of the tens of thousands of cheques issued by the thousands 
of officers stationed in England during the same period, Canadian Headquarters 
recognized the potential damage each individual transgression inflicted on officers’ 
collective reputation and general credit. Routine Order 390 and Divisional Order 
1170 circulated on March 8, 1916, stipulated that under no circumstances was 
a Canadian officer to issue a cheque unless he confirmed that his account held 
sufficient funds. Each officer needed to sign a certificate acknowledging compliance 
with the order. “You cannot be too severe with cases of this kind,” Carson advised 
General MacDougall in expressing support for “any drastic measures that you 
feel necessary to take.”62 On March 28, 1916, Lieutenant Joseph Fish of the Eaton 
Machine Gun Battery became the first Canadian officer convicted by general court 
martial under the new regulations. The thirty-four-year-old Toronto auto salesman 
was cashiered for dishonouring cheques with an army pay clerk, several hotels, 
and a pair of women “of a very doubtful character.” After the verdict assistant 
judge advocate general Lieutenant-Colonel Maurice Alexander expected, “this 
man should act as an example for the rest of the officers,” and advised the 
distribution of a confidential circular warning “any future offences will be dealt 
with in a similar manner.”63 
Two subsequent cases showed how the cheque problem went beyond the 
limited number charges cited by the prosecution. In April 1916, Lieutenant H. 
A. Proctor of the Eaton Machine Gun Battery issued nine worthless cheques to 
two hotel proprietors, an optician, a bookkeeper, a cashier, and a tobacconist. 
Although only charged for offences committed after the March order, during the 
61 LAC, RG 9 III-A-1, vol. 2, file 2-1-10, Bank of Montreal to Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, March 27, 
1916. 
62 LAC, RG 9 III-B-1-7, vol. 1484, file D-57-7, Divisional Order 1170; and LAC, RG 9 III-A-1, vol. 2, file 
2-1-10, Carson to MacDougall, March 11, 1916.
63 LAC, RG 9 III-A-1, vol. 145, file 6-F-106, Alexander to Carson, March 31, 1916.
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four months Proctor’s account was open with the Bank of Montreal, he had issued 
a total of seventy-five cheques; thirty-six for £162 3s. 5d., which were honoured 
in comparison to thirty-nine for £151 4s. 4d., which were dishonoured. Prosecutor 
Lieutenant N. L. Tooker of the 30th Reserve Battalion pointed out that a man 
might overlook his bank balance once or twice but the large number of worthless 
cheques indicated that the frauds had been deliberate. “If then it is proved that 
the accused committed a criminal action,” Tooker argued, “it follows, ipso facto, 
that his conduct was scandalous and unbecoming the character of an Officer and 
a Gentleman.”64 Proctor, a thirty-three-year-old real estate agent from Richmond 
Hill, Ontario, was sentenced to be cashiered on June 2, 1916.65 
Three days later the same court tried Lieutenant K. R. Green of the Canadian 
Field Artillery for dishonouring a pair of £3 cheques. His defence counsel argued 
that the cheques given to non-commissioned officer friends had signified “personal 
transactions.” As in the previous case, Tooker introduced a history of the accused’s 
banking record, which again had to be struck from the record because it dealt with 
instances not in the charge sheet. During the four months since Green’s account 
had been opened after being commissioned from the ranks, he had issued forty-
nine cheques for £166 19s. 1d., of which twelve amounting to £35 3s. 4d. were 
dishonoured. Green attributed the oversights to the late arrival of money cabled 
from his father, which he frequently expected. In recognition of Green’s good 
record at Second Ypres, where he had been wounded, and noting it was his first 
offence, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander reported, “the Court gave him the benefit 
of the doubt.”66
Increasing courts martial pointed to the greater willingness of military 
authorities to resort to the legal process to enforce discipline but the number of 
prosecutions also showed that the problem persisted. By November 1917, the 
office of the adjutant-general reported that the trouble with bad cheques “shows 
no sign of diminishing.”67 Nearly 90% of CEF prosecutions for bad cheques 
occurred between 1917 and the demobilization period in 1919. Of a total 228 
general courts martial held against Canadian officers in England throughout 
the war, 21.5% concerned dishonoured cheques; but the issue extended even 
beyond these specific prosecutions.68 Situations like that with Lieutenant Lyall, 
whose transgressions had been largely concealed, point to the limits of using the 
court martial record in assessing nonjudicial responses to bad cheques. Beyond 
prosecutions that served to set examples as deterrents, military authorities pursued 
64 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8693, file 602-16-15, Court Martial of Lieutenant Proctor. 
65 Proctor re-enlisted in Toronto and transferred to the 1st Canadian Tank Battalion but the war ended before 
it was to deploy.
66 LAC, RG 9 III-A-1, vol. 149, file 6-G-116, Alexander to Carson, June 10, 1916. After a second court 
martial resulted in a commuted sentence of dismissal in May 1917, Green was cashiered for being AWOL 
in France in May 1918. He quickly re-enlisted in the ranks.
67 LAC, RG 9 III-B-1, vol. 1235, file D-34-5, Colonel F. S. Morrison to Adjutant-General, November 20, 
1917.
68 Many charges from embezzlement to drunkenness to illegal absence to even a murder case tried by an 
English civil court featured officers’ cheques. Indebted from worthless cheques, Lieutenant G. Codere 
murdered a sergeant while stealing regimental funds in December 1915. The death sentence was commuted 
to life imprisonment due to insanity. R. v. Codere (1916), 12 Cr. App. R. 21.
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other tactics from routine orders to lectures to restricted pay.69 Through their 
selective administrative and legal responses, Canadian overseas officials indicated 
that the more efficient approach was to enforce some form of regulation over the 
issue of worthless cheques rather than hope to completely eradicate the practice.
Banking Knowledge and Defence Arguments
Though representative of only a small fraction of all Canadian cheques issued by 
military members, analysis of 187 dishonoured cheques recorded in courts martial 
proceedings identifies officers’ most frequent types of transactions: 25.7% with 
military personnel, primarily regimental paymasters and mess sergeants; 23.9% 
with various civilians, service providers, and other merchants; 21.2% with hotels; 
13.4% with tailors and outfitters; 10% with English banks; and 5.8% with the 
Royal Automobile Club, which granted honourary membership to all Canadian 
officers. Officers issued cheques for two primary reasons: in payment for goods 
and services and in exchange for cash. Over a third of the dishonoured cheques 
documented in the courts martial record had been converted for pounds sterling 
at banks, hotels, or shops. An officer who acquired disposable cash in this manner 
usually hoped military pay or funds from home would fill his account before the 
receiver attempted to cash the cheque. 
The Bank of Montreal recorded instances when clerks refused a cheque against 
an officer’s account in a monthly list forwarded to Canadian Headquarters. Nine 
months into the stricter enforcement policy following the March 1916 divisional 
order, the general commanding the training division at Shorncliffe found that the 
dishonouring of cheques “continues to be quite too large,” and requested that 
the bank send immediate notice of individual officers’ overdrawn accounts to 
expedite prosecutions.70 Due to the protracted and complicated nature of financial 
investigations, Canadian military authorities were particularly interested in details 
regarding the balance of an account at the time a cheque had been both issued 
and dishonoured in order to establish the officer’s liability. Producing evidence 
of intent to dishonour a cheque—essential for a conviction under Section 16—
proved difficult because it required access to the accused’s bank book. The Bank 
of Montreal manager, G. C. Cassells, expressed “complete sympathy” with the 
strategy but pointed out bankers “are debarred from divulging any information 
regarding customer’s accounts to a third party.” He suggested for the headquarters 
staff to issue an order clarifying that officers’ accounts would “be considered a 
military matter” in order to protect the bank from criticism.71 Bankers attempted 
69 LAC, RG 9 III-B-1, vol. 1235, file D-34-5, Colonel F.S. Morrison, memo, November 20, 1917; LAC, RG 
9 III-B-1-7, vol. 1484, file D-57-7, Brigadier-General P. E. Thacker, circular letter, March 26, 1917; and 
LAC, RG 9 III-B-1, vol. 3019, file C-1-34, Policy Regarding Officers Dishonoured Cheques, May 1, 1918. 
70 LAC, RG 9 III-B-1, vol. 395, file C-66-1, Canadian Training Division, Shorncliffe to Bank of Montreal, 
November 24, 1916.
71 LAC, RG 9 III-B-1, vol. 395, file C-66-1, Cassels to CO, Canadian Training Division, Shorncliffe, 
December 1, 1916. The Bankers’ Books Evidence Act (1879) stipulated, “A banker or officer of a bank 
shall not, in any legal proceeding to which the bank is not a party, be compellable to produce any banker’s 
book the contents of which can be proved under this Act, or to appear as a witness to prove the matters, 
transactions, and accounts therein recorded, unless by order of a judge made for special cause.”
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to balance a commitment to aid the war effort with an assurance of client 
confidentially. 
Many defendants facing a general court martial faulted the bank for failing to 
warn them when in danger of overdrawing their accounts. One defence counsel 
articulated a common excuse when he declared, “some official of the Bank of 
Montreal should be in this chair to-day instead of the accused.”72 Given the 
enormous amount of financial paperwork and recordkeeping involved in matters of 
pay, occasional errors made by clerks at either the bank or the army pay office could 
cause an officer to unknowingly issue a cheque against an empty or nonexistent 
account.73 Faulting the bank for cheque problems fit into a wider defence strategy 
that aimed to excuse money mismanagement due to an accused’s alleged financial 
illiteracy. Officers adjusting to the newfound privileges and responsibilities as 
“temporary gentlemen” did not always have the financial knowledge or business 
experience to correctly manage their income. Although warned to wait for bank 
accounts to be adjusted to ensure sufficient funds had been deposited, newly 
commissioned officers were particularly vulnerable to writing cheques in excess 
of their outfit allowance and in anticipation of their increased pay.74
According to routine orders, inattentiveness or ignorance of a bank balance 
constituted no excuse for an overdrawn account. Court martial board members 
appreciated the complexity of financial matters but they also balanced any 
leniency with a disciplinary need for a deterrent effect. Young and recently 
commissioned officers could receive a sympathetic hearing. Appealing for mercy 
during Lieutenant F. R. Brown’s first court martial in January 1917, his defence 
counsel acknowledged the accused “might have displayed a more keener business 
interest ... but he is very young and has no knowledge of Bank transactions.”75 
Brown’s initial offences had resulted in severe reprimand and loss of seniority 
but a second court martial several months later proved that the twenty-two-year-
old officer had not learned his lesson or profited from the first court’s mercy. The 
second court sentenced Brown to be cashiered on August 24, 1917.76 
Some defendants attributed financial negligence to the strange and 
unpredictable effects of the war itself on the human mind. Though the 
psychological damage of shell shock and concussion remained poorly understood in 
contemporary medical theories, some doctors acknowledged that genuine sufferers 
disturbed by traumatic stress or memory lapses were not always responsible for 
erratic behaviours while on leave or in hospital. In case reports, doctors recorded 
the reckless money management of some patients under treatment for shock or 
neurasthenia. Worries over money difficulties and the threat of legal consequences 
72 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8691, file 332-24-50, Court Martial of Lieutenant Rankin.
73 LAC, RG 9 III-B-1, vol. 765, file P-67-2, Evidence in General Court Martial Cases of Officers Issuing 
Worthless Cheques, July 26, 1917.
74 LAC, RG 9 III-B-1, vol. 765, file P-67-2, Major Ferguson to Chief Paymaster, September 4, 1917. 
75 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8692, file 338-20-71, Court Martial of Lieutenant Brown.
76 Brown re-enlisted in the British Army but was later sentenced to six months hard labour for desertion and 
wearing an unauthorized uniform. Shortly after his release from prison he deployed to the front and died of 
wounds on September 17, 1918. TNA, WO 363, Service File of F.R. Brown. 
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in turn aggravated mental overstrain.77 Court martial members remained skeptical 
of appeals to an accused’s mental confusion and overwrought nerves. Dominant 
cultural interpretations of character and willpower implied that war trauma in most 
cases only exposed latent personality traits and pre-existing tendencies.78 As one 
officer argued while prosecuting a case of dishonoured cheques, “Shell shock may 
have queer results, but I do not think that it makes an honest man dishonest.”79
The image of a newly commissioned officer ruined by financial naivety or a 
shell shocked veteran rendered destitute by reckless spending had some basis in 
reality. Most charged for the offence though appeared worldly enough to appreciate 
the consequences of issuing cheques without sufficient funds. The average age of 
Canadian officers court martialled for bad cheques was twenty-eight, half had 
served in the militia or the British Army, and nearly a quarter had worked either in 
a bank or in finance in civil life. Captain Percy Bidwell, a Winnipeg bank manager 
and paymaster for the 44th Battalion, could not feign ignorance of proper money 
management when cashiered for passing bad cheques to fellow officers.80 By 
often targeting more experienced men, particularly those with apparent banking 
knowledge, the military justice system tended to remove officers unable to claim 
a youthful indiscretion as an excuse. That most defendants—both older and 
younger officers—faced multiple charges further indicated from the prosecution’s 
perspective either habitual carelessness or intentional deceit. Of all Canadian 
officers court martialled for dishonoured cheques, 45% were also charged for 
absence without leave or desertion. As the practice of dishonouring cheques 
frequently accompanied illegal absences, the stoppage in pay meant any cheques 
issued during that period were even more likely to be returned for insufficient 
funds.
Military leaders regarded dishonouring cheques purely as an officer’s offence 
because the authority to hold a chequebook derived from a commission and the 
bank accounts had been opened at the direction of the army. One divisional general 
stated, “It is an exceptional case to charge a Private soldier ... and it cannot be 
treated from the same standpoint as an Officer.”81 Lacking the credibility of higher 
rank, privates who attempted to cash army cheques were supposed to show their 
paybook to regimental paymasters. Soldiers caught dishonouring cheques with 
civilians in England were sometimes subject to prosecution and imprisonment 
77 Frederick Mott, War Neuroses and Shell Shock (London: H. Frowde; Hodder & Stoughton, 1919), pp. 212, 
226, 267; Elmer Ernest Southard, Shell Shock and Other Neuropsychiatric Problems (Boston: W. M. 
Leonard, 1919), pp. 122, 264-266, 449, 1054; “Shell Shock and Criminal Acts,” The Lancet, vol. 188, 
no. 4857 (Sept 1916): p. 624-65; and “Medicine and the Law,” The Lancet, vol. 193, no. 4998 (June 1919): 
p. 1041.
78 Ted Bogacz, “War Neurosis and Cultural Change in England, 1914-1922: The Work of the War Office 
Committee of Enquiry into ‘Shell-Shock,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 24, no. 2 (1989): 
pp. 229-230; Adam Montgomery, The Invisible Injured: Psychological Trauma in the Canadian Military 
from the First World War to Afghanistan (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017), pp. 34-
35; and Clive Emsley, “Violent Crime in England in 1919: Post-war Anxieties and Press Narratives,” 
Continuity and Change, vol. 23, no. 1 (2008): pp. 187-189.
79 LAC, RG 24, reel T-17685, file 602-8-48, Militia File of Lieutenant Hamel. 
80 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8692, file 332-120-84, Court Martial of Captain Bidwell.
81 LAC, RG 9 III-B-1, vol. 931, file D-18-3-9, GOC, 3rd Canadian Division to Canadian Corps, January 24, 
1918.
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by civil courts; in only a few unusual instances did the offence come before a 
district court martial.82 In August 1917, Private Frank Hann, batman to Lieutenant 
J. A. McKinnon, cashed four cheques by forging his officer’s signature. Bank 
of Montreal clerks easily noticed the crude handwriting and the sixteen-year-old 
private was sentenced by a district court martial to one-year detention. McKinnon 
set a poor example for his batman as the lieutenant had been severely reprimanded 
one month earlier for dishonouring five cheques.83 
Reflecting implicit assumptions about a man’s capacity for honour and 
the importance of rank in the scale of punishments, ordinary soldiers endured 
confinement while officers faced either reprimand or removal for similar types of 
offences. Framing the crime under Section 16 actually served to shield officers 
from more punitive sentences.84 A conviction under Section 16 could result in no 
higher or lesser penalty than cashiering whereas a civil court conviction for false 
pretences or forgery could result in a prison term.85 Though officers may have 
resented being court martialled for what they regarded as a social offence, framing 
dishonoured cheques as a breach of military discipline rather than criminal fraud 
ensured punishment remained under military jurisdiction.  
Military Status and Civilians Creditors
Financial interactions highlighted the complicated relationship between officers 
and civilians on the home front. Frustrated by a client’s refusal to settle an 
account, an Inverness sporting outfitter complained, “It is rather a serious matter 
that men of this kind should incur debt, and not pay, as it spoils on other officers 
when doing business.”86 Despite being occasional victims of fraud or negligence, 
English bankers’, business people’s, and individuals’ continued willingness to 
receive Canadian cheques suggested an acceptance of the potential risk. At the 
same time, refusing a cheque from a man in uniform represented a direct challenge 
to his honour; an awkward proposition for a shopkeeper or bank teller not serving 
in the military.87 Businesspeople therefore weighed an accusation against a client 
in uniform with great caution. The manager of Lewis Moses Ltd., an outfitter 
of military uniforms, suggested a client could reimburse in installments, “as we 
82 “Canadian Soldier and his Cheque,” Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, July 19, 1917, p. 4; “Cheques 
Case,” Folkestone, Hythe, Sandgate & Cheriton Herald, June 8, 1918, p. 5; and “Worthless Cheque 
Canadian,” Lancashire Evening Post, June 30, 1919, p. 6.
83 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8666, file 649-H-19208, Court Martial of Private Hann.
84 Gilbert, “Law and Honour,” p. 76.
85 Court martial conviction under Section 41, a civil offence, for deliberate cheque fraud or forgery could 
by contrast result in a prison sentence. Civil magistrates likewise could sentence officers and ex-officers 
to prison terms. Examples include, “Worthless Cheques,” Daily Record, February 18, 1916, p. 3; “Ex-
Officer’s Cheques,” Aberdeen Evening Express, January 28, 1918, p. 2; “Wearing the V.C. Decoration, 
Charge Against a Canadian Officer,” Birmingham Mail, February 7, 1916, p. 3; and LAC, RG 9 III-A-1, 
vol. 119, file 6-M-136, Overseas Ministry File of Lieutenant Morton.
86 LAC, RG 24, reel T-17701, file 649-P-459, John MacPherson to Paymaster General, July 11, 1918.
87 For more on home front interactions between civilians and men in uniform, see Adrian Gregory, The Last 
Great War: British Society and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and 
Laura Ugolini, Civvies: Middle-class Men on the English Home Front, 1914-18 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2013).
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did not wish to cause any Officer to get into trouble.”88 Some officers in turn 
appealed to their military status in order to pressure creditors. Lieutenant J. A. 
McKinnon unsuccessfully attempted to dissuade one complainant from reporting 
his dishonoured cheques, writing, “Besides you must realize what taking such a 
step would mean for me—very probably a courtmartial [sic]—I don’t suppose that 
I should be cashiered or anything like that but it would be damned unpleasant.”89
In a wartime atmosphere that placed a high value on khaki, men who 
impersonated officers or embellished their records found opportunities to exploit 
the social and financial access bestowed by simply wearing a uniform. Newspaper 
stories of “bogus lieutenants” frequently included reports of their worthless 
cheques and swindling.90 As the antithesis of honesty and fidelity, the character 
of the gentleman-swindler represented a subversive and pernicious form of 
masculinity that misappropriated the appearance of respectability in pursuit of 
personal gain.91 The expected respect granted to men in uniform made civilians 
vulnerable to such deceptions and reluctant to dispute an officer’s integrity. To 
do so risked the possibility of making an embarrassing and insulting accusation 
against an authentic hero.
English businesspeople and bankers granted officer-clients a degree of latitude 
but could exert pressure when reminders went unanswered. Demanding payment 
for a pair of dishonoured cheques, a tailor warned one officer, “we will give you 48 
hours to make these right” before threatening to report the matter to authorities.92 
Continued violations caused impatient civilians to lose any deference to rank. On 
July 8, 1918, the manager of Lloyd’s Bank in Hastings began a letter to Captain 
J. P. McIntosh, who had dishonoured several cheques in the preceding months, 
“I should be glad if you could arrange for credit balances to be the rule in your 
account.” A month later the sub-manager warned more firmly but respectfully, “I 
beg to say that I must ask you not to draw cheques upon us without providing the 
funds to meet them. It is very detrimental to the good name of the Bank as well 
as that of yourself for cheques to be returned unpaid.” By August 22, the bank 
manager demanded McIntosh no longer use “our” chequebook and admonished 
the captain, “I do not look for such things to be done by officers who have the 
honour to wear His Majesty’s uniform.”93 A court cashiered McIntosh, a thirty-
eight-year-old quartermaster in the Canadian Army Medical Corps, on November 
8, 1918.
88 LAC, RG 24, reel T-17672, file 602-2-413, Lewis Moses, Ltd. to Captain Suthie, June 16, 1919.
89 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8694, file 602-12-389, Court Martial of Lieutenant McKinnon. After being 
reprimanded, McKinnon served in France and won the Military Cross.
90 “Bogus Lieutenant,” Manchester Evening News, November 26, 1915, p. 2; “Obtaining Goods by False 
Cheques,” Aberdeen Press and Journal, January 8, 1917, p. 2; “Army Chaplain Swindles Banks,” Toronto 
Globe, July 18, 1918, p. 7; and LAC, RG 24, vol. 6643, file 12-123-17, Imposters posing as British Officers 
in USA and Canada.
91 For connections between masculinity and financial crime, see Michael Levi, Fraud: The Extent and Causes 
of White Collar Crime (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999), pp. xv-xvii; and Hazell Croall, Understanding 
White Collar Crime (Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 2001), pp. 96-97.
92 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8691, file 332-27-65, Court Martial of Lieutenant McCormack.
93 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8694, file 602-13-43, Court Martial of Captain McIntosh. For many banks and 
businesses, liability to reimburse an irrecoverable debt fell to the cashier who had been unfortunate enough 
to cash the bad cheque.
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One of McIntosh’s creditors, hotel manager Frank Fowler, wrote to Canadian 
authorities asking for payment of £30, explaining, “I am very loath to take civil 
action against this man especially as he is an officer ... if it is possible to settle the 
matter in any other way I should be glad to avoid the publicity which I know must 
be detrimental to an officer.”94Although certain officers had exploited the status 
of their uniforms to gain the trust of civilians, Canadian Headquarters refused to 
assume the responsibility to compensate creditors for financial losses by using 
public money. The government could not compel officers or soldiers to settle 
private debts and advised creditors that “the public run the same risks in giving 
credit to men in uniform as to civilians.”95 Confronted by defrauded English 
people seeking restitution for unpaid cheques, the secretary of the Pay Office in 
London stated, “this office is nothing but a collection agency.”96 
In October 1917, Lewis Moses, Ltd. wrote to the Canadian militia office in 
Ottawa to complain that twelve officer-clients had left England without settling their 
unpaid accounts.97 None had been court martialled for their worthless cheques; five 
had been returned as medically unfit, four as surplus to requirements, two resigned 
their commissions, and one was dismissed by court martial for disobedience. 
Major G. Barclay, deputy assistant adjutant-general, offered the standard reply 
that the government had “nothing to do with private debts of officers.”98 He 
nevertheless recognized that refusal to intervene aggravated already embarrassing 
situations, particularly because technically honourably retired officers received 
a post-discharge bonus of three-month’s extra pay upon arrival back in Canada. 
Barclay found “the injustice of this system” intolerable, arguing, “There are 
dozens of cases where men Overseas have disgraced the credit of Canadians by 
their dishonoured cheques, and who on return to this country as surplus officers or 
otherwise, are being paid a large bonus for their good service whereas all they have 
done is destroy Canadian credit in the Old Country.”99 Unauthorized deductions to 
an officer’s outstanding pay in order to settle indebtedness left behind in England 
remained “quite illegal.”100
The Canadian government did not assume the debts of its military members, 
though overseas officials attempted to encourage ex-officers to settle outstanding 
claims with civilian creditors. Deputy judge advocate general Lieutenant-Colonel 
R. M. Dennistoun expressed his opinion that, “every effort should be made to 
protect the claims of these creditors which adversely affect the good name of 
Canadian Officers.”101 As only cheques that represented public claims or regimental 
debts could be charged against an officer’s outstanding pay and allowances, the 
94 LAC, RG 9 III-A-1, vol. 65, file 10-2-39, Frank Fowler to GOC, Shorncliffe, September 1918.
95 LAC, RG 24, reel T-17528, file 5585-1, Militia File of Captain Ross.
96 LAC, RG 9 III-B-1, vol. 765, file P-67-2, Evidence in General Court Martial Cases of Officers Issuing 
Worthless Cheques, July 26, 1917.
97 LAC, RG 24, reel T-17670, file 602-2-125, Lewis Moses, Ltd. to Canadian Militia Office, October 16 1917.
98 LAC, RG 24, reel T-17670, file 602-2-125, Major Barclay to Lewis Moses, Ltd., November 8, 1917.
99 LAC, RG 24, vol. 1133, HQ-54-21-50-52, Major Barclay to Colonel MacInnus, October 19, 1917.
100 LAC, RG 24, reel T-17670, file 602-2-125, Major Barclay to Assistant Paymaster General, December 19, 
1917.
101 LAC, RG 9 III-A-1, vol. 256, file 10-C-85, Lieutenant-Colonel Dennistoun to Deputy Minister, OMFC, 
April 27, 1917.
321
offender needed to authorize deductions in cases of private debts.102 By signing 
an authorization form an officer enabled the Chief Paymaster to make out a new 
cheque for the local Canadian command to divert funds to civilian creditors. If an 
ex-officer refused to have any of his outstanding pay garnished in this manner, 
Dennistoun supposed, “the only thing to do is to pay the money into the bank 
account leaving the creditors to scramble for it as they see fit.”103 As former 
officers who had been either dismissed by court martial or struck off strength 
from the CEF became private citizens they could be held liable to civil suits.104 
The official policy to facilitate repayment to creditors was ironically not 
immune to fraud itself. In June 1916, Lieutenant T. G. MacFie of the 30th Reserve 
Battalion, entrusted to collect dishonoured cheques at Shorncliffe, endorsed 
several cheques designated for other officers’ creditors, thereby misapplying a total 
of £52. MacFie, who had helped to draft Divisional Order 1170, which warned 
against dishonouring cheques, subsequently issued at least six bad cheques for 
£45 before his arrest in August.105 Though he admitted to little knowledge of either 
banking or the law, MacFie chose to defend himself at the general court martial 
on September 8, 1916. 
Resentful that he had been denied a fighting position at the front, MacFie 
presented himself as a disenchanted opponent of intrusive military policies. He 
suggested his actions in misapplying the funds had been more of a foolish form 
of protest and frustration rather than deliberate fraud. He argued that diverting ex-
officers’ outstanding pay to liquidate private debts violated their rights as he felt 
it occurred without consent. He challenged the legality of Divisional Order 1170 
and claimed to have previously refused to recommend prosecutions under that 
order. MacFie articulated a common complaint against the broad application of 
Section 16 in prosecuting what he deemed a social offence:
I do not know the Dictionary meaning for “Scandalous.” Presumably it is such 
conduct that would bring the name of Officers into disrepute. This matter was never 
taken up publicly and it never came to the notice of anybody outside the individual 
who cashed the cheque and he was most unwilling to make any complaint. He 
did not make any complaint. The information was got from the Bank and I still 
disagree with the Proprietor of the Bank giving that information, so I do not see 
how there could possibly be any scandal. Scandal must be the result of something 
fairly public, and I cannot see, under the circumstances how a private matter like 
that between myself and a Civilian, which has been ferreted out by the Prosecution, 
could be called “Scandalous Conduct.”106
102 LAC, RG 9 III-A-1, vol. 256, file 10-C-85, Adjutant-General to Canadian Headquarters, April 25, 1917.
103 LAC, RG 9 III-A-1, vol. 256, file 10-C-85, Lieutenant-Colonel Dennistoun to Deputy Minister, OMFC, 
April 27, 1917. 
104 During demobilization in 1919, Routine Order 1736 enabled the Judge Advocate General to withhold 
an officer’s war service gratuity until dishonoured cheques had been liquidated. Former officers who 
failed to repay debts lost eligibility for the gratuity and would be struck from the active militia list. Many 
officers nevertheless returned to Canada without resolving unsettled debts. Correspondence and reminders 
sometimes continued years after the war with creditors never fully recovering their losses.
105 LAC, RG 9 III-A-1, vol. 306, file 10-Mc-46, Overseas Ministry File of Lieutenant MacFie.
106 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8694, file 602-13-13, Court Martial of Lieutenant MacFie.
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The court acquitted Macfie on all counts of Section 16 but it is unclear to what 
extent his arguments factored into the court’s decision. Finding him guilty on the 
alternative charges and embezzlement, the court sentenced MacFie to dismissal 
with a recommendation for mercy owing to his earlier fine record of staff work.107 
MacFie’s case exposed a central grievance over the ability of banks and the 
army to intrude on the privacy of officers’ affairs and to intervene in personal 
financial transactions. Officers like MacFie doubted whether private financial 
disputes produced any broader scandal and countered that the prosecutions 
themselves had publicized dealings which could otherwise have been resolved 
independently between issuer and receiver. As the lieutenant who had collected 
other officers’ dishonoured cheques at Shorncliffe, MacFie knew the extent and 
implications of the problem. Certain civilians only reluctantly filed a complaint, 
but that choice often rested on a hesitancy to testify against an officer or become 
entangled in a legal case—particularly with no guarantee of repayment. If an 
increasing number of cheque frauds went unpunished, English creditors would 
likely have become less deferential to and trusting of a commissioned rank. Once 
the bank refused a cheque the possibility for greater publicity increased, even if 
the transaction had initially involved only one civilian and one officer. In some 
cases, worthless cheques unknowingly passed through several hands in payment 
for various goods and services before being presented at the bank. A tangled 
web of agreements and transactions between multiple individuals, the gossip 
of creditors, and the risk to the reputation of the bank ensured that dishonoured 
cheques became public scandals.
Public Scandals and Private Affairs 
It is significant that Canadian military leaders largely did not regard other illicit, 
and therefore potentially scandalous, indiscretions as worthy of charges for 
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. Gambling, venereal disease, 
paying prostitutes, or bigamy with English women risked creating public 
scandals as well, yet from a legal point of view Canadian Headquarters expressed 
far greater concern with protecting the financial reputation of its officer corps 
as opposed to punishing other types of immorality. As the court martial of one 
young officer illustrated, cheque fraud sometimes intersected with vice, yet 
military justice tended to only intervene in an officer’s private affairs when it 
involved financial misconduct. Following his arrest, Lieutenant R. J. Beck of the 
8th Reserve Battalion attributed all his money troubles to “two things: drink and 
women.” On the morning of October 30, 1917, after spending the night with one 
woman, Beck gave her a £3 cheque knowing it was no good. After spending the 
next night with another woman, he signed a false name and presented her with a 
£5 cheque. Finding him guilty on ten charges including dishonouring cheques, 
forgery, and fraudulently converting a ring belonging to the first woman by giving 
107 Rejected for re-enlistment with the CEF, MacFie joined the 4th South African Scottish in January 1918, 
earned a commission, and won the Military Cross and Distinguished Service Order. He continued his 
swindling ways into the postwar period with reports of cons and frauds committed across Europe. LAC, 
RG 24, reel T-17692, file 602-13-13, Militia File of Lieutenant MacFie.
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it to a third woman, the court sentenced the twenty-year-old to be cashiered plus 
one year hard labour.108 
Despite Beck’s confession that he had paid—or pretended to pay—the two 
women, the prosecution never raised a question of prostitution. Compensation 
for companionship and sex was as much a matter of negotiation based on implicit 
social arrangements as any other financial exchange. The relationships formed 
between men in uniform and civilian woman could be at once emotional and 
transactional.109 Beck appeared to know the first woman on a more intimate basis 
as he summarized their evening in Folkestone: “we had tea together and after 
dinner we attended a theatre. After the theatre was out I went home with her and 
stayed with her.”110 He had met the second woman in London and identified the 
temporary nature of the relationship with a stranger when he invented a false name 
to sign the worthless £5 cheque. 
Through intimate and/or illicit relationships with women, some officers 
discovered that a dishonoured cheque could test the limits of acceptable 
gentlemanly propriety. After a British second lieutenant and a woman “passed 
the night together,” the officer presented her with a £2 10s. cheque, which was 
subsequently dishonoured. The court martial proceedings revealed that the 
accused had later enclosed a good cheque to his female companion along with a 
letter explaining, “I had a double motive in giving you that useless piece of paper 
... First of all, I give you a selfish reason; that is, you wanted rather more than I 
could afford. Secondly, my reason was to teach you a lesson, because I really think 
some of you girls are extraordinarily stupid in taking cheques from fellows you 
had never known or seen before. It is an absolute temptation to a fellow to give 
you a ‘dud’ cheque.” He concluded the note, “Now really don’t you think you had 
better be more careful in future, my dear girl? At least, ask a fellow for his card or 
letter proving his name. I was surprised how very slack you were about it.”111 His 
“lesson” suggested that male officers could naturally be expected to deceive yet 
ironically faulted supposedly naïve women for being too trusting and careless in 
dealings with military members.
The British and dominion armies claimed to prohibit sexual immorality, 
but courts martial rarely enforced discipline related to nonfinancial, domestic 
affairs.112After a July 1917 police raid of a Hythe brothel patronized by Canadians 
and operated by two British officers, the commanding general at Shorncliffe 
108 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8693, file 602-2-294, Court Martial of Lieutenant Beck. As some charges fell 
under Section 41, a civil offence, the court could include a prison term. Beck received early release from 
Canterbury Prison to re-enlist on July 18, 1918. 
109 Angela Woollacott, “‘Khaki Fever’ and Its Control: Gender, Class, Age and Sexual Morality on the British 
Homefront in the First World War,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 29, no. 2 (1994): p. 326; and 
Clare Makespeace, “Male Heterosexuality and Prostitution during the Great War,” Cultural and Social 
History, vol. 9, no. 1 (2012): p. 74.
110 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8693, file 602-2-294, Court Martial of Lieutenant Beck.
111 “Officer and Girl,” Illustrated Police News, December 21, 1916, p. 3. Though found guilty, the officer was 
only severely reprimanded.
112 On regulating sexual morality and prostitution, see, Philippa Levine, Prostitution, Race, and Politics: 
Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 161-167; and Susan R. 
Grayzel, Women and the First World War (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 69-73.
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distributed a confidential circular warning of “the great and almost certain risk 
of publicity, prosecution and contraction of disease which Officers run when 
they frequent brothels or have intercourse with prostitutes.”113 When Canadian 
authorities attempted to prosecute one married officer for violating the circular 
by bringing “into the vicinity of Shorncliffe, a woman for immoral purposes,” the 
defence counsel forcefully and successfully objected to any charge that punished 
a man for “domestic offences.” The defending officer asserted it was not a military 
offence or even a civil misdemeanor “for a married man to sleep or cohabit with 
a woman who is not his wife and not a prostitute.”114 The not guilty verdict 
suggested that charges for heterosexual immorality existed beyond the purview of 
good order and military discipline.115 Although officials attempted to discourage 
officers from engaging in this type of vice, the small number of charges related 
to sexual immorality and the smaller fraction of convictions indicated that legally 
enforcing conduct of a social or domestic nature was not as high a priority.116 
Officers faced courts martial for bad cheques, not venereal disease or bigamy 
and only rarely for offences related to sexual misconduct.117 By prioritizing their 
legal and disciplinary resources, Canadian overseas officials did not consider 
promiscuous behaviours or relations with prostitutes as the types of public 
scandal to warrant charges under Section 16. On the contrary, by focusing on the 
dishonouring of a cheque rather than on the possible salacious purposes behind the 
exchanges, courts martial could treat a woman who negotiated a price for sex as 
simply another defrauded service provider. As long as both parties honoured their 
financial arrangement, any officer’s tryst remained a private affair that military 
authorities showed little interest in scrutinizing too closely.118 
As instances of officers paying female companions suggested, unauthorized 
financial exchanges that nevertheless followed an honour code fit within the 
bounds of acceptable gentlemanly behaviour. The circumstances in which an 
officer issued a cheque influenced how certain behaviours could be perceived 
as honourable or dishonourable from a moral perspective. As not all debts were 
113 “A Disorderly House,” Folkestone, Hythe, Sandgate & Cheriton Herald, August 11, 1917, p. 3; and LAC, 
RG 9 III-B-1-7, vol. 1484, file D-59-7, Discipline Officers Generally.
114 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8651, file 649-A-3441, Court Martial of Lieutenant Auclair.
115 Same-sex relationships between officers and soldiers meanwhile were considered “gross indecency.” While 
several Canadian officers were charged under Section 16 for homosexual acts, only two were convicted 
and cashiered. Examining attitudes within the military toward heterosexuality and homosexuality, and the 
potential risk of imposing anachronistic labels of distinct sexual identities on the First World War era, is 
however beyond the scope of this article. For deeper analysis on this topic, see Ana Carden-Coyne and 
Laura Doan, “Gender and Sexuality,” in Susan R. Grayzel and Tammy M. Proctor, eds., Gender and the 
Great War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 91-114.
116 For further detail on how informal army policies could serve to sanction officers’ visits to prostitutes, see 
Makespeace, “Male Heterosexuality and Prostitution,” pp. 71-72. 
117 Theoretically, ordinary soldiers who purposefully contracted a venereal disease could be charged with 
a form of malingering, however, in practice, soldiers were usually only punished for refusing treatment 
or concealing the disease. Levine, Prostitution, Race and Politics, pp. 161-164; and Morton, When Your 
Number’s Up, pp. 200-202.
118 The Assistant Provost Marshal (APM) occasionally reported on officers associating with suspected 
prostitutes but the investigations did not result in arrest or formal charges. See LAC, RG 9 III-B-1-34, 
vol. 3030, file R-8-34, Reports Private, APM London; and LAC, RG 9 III-B-1-34, vol. 3029, file R-1-34, 
Reports Generally, APM London.
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considered equal, examples of how officers prioritized their liabilities pointed 
to the flexible meaning of financial honour. For instance, a number of officers 
attached to the Canadian Machine Gun Depot at Seaford settled poker losses 
with each other by way of post-dated cheques. They had established a “distinct 
understanding” that the cheques would not be cashed without the consent of the 
drawer. As the games had become “no-limit,” one player admitted the losses 
“might well embarrass an officer.” In one instance a man cashed a cheque covering 
the poker loses of Captain A. C. Bowles without his knowledge, which caused him 
to later dishonour two cheques with an English tailor in September 1917. Despite 
“no-limit” gambling technically being in violation of regulations, the court martial 
found Bowles not guilty because the captain had reasonable grounds for believing 
his bank account had still contained sufficient funds.119
While the prosecutor argued that Bowles had evidently placed poker debts 
ahead of other financial obligations, from the perspective of fellow officers, 
including the depot commanding officer, Bowles had behaved correctly.120 One 
fellow poker player stated, “In all my dealings with the accused I have found 
him perfectly honourable & trustworthy.” Another officer called Bowles “the soul 
of honour.” A captain who had fought with Bowles in France enthused that he 
was “universally respected by both officers and men. He always sought the most 
dangerous spot in the line and was the first officer in the 5th MG Coy. [Machine 
Gun Company] to win a decoration. I consider the accused to be absolutely 
honourable.”121 A gambler on and off the battlefield, Bowles was not the type 
of officer that the service could afford to lose. The testimony of the witnesses 
suggested a broader interpretation of honourableness beyond the more narrow 
definition articulated by the prosecutor. Under this more expansive formulation, an 
officer’s honourable reputation went beyond simply settling debts with civilians to 
instead reflect how he behaved among fellow officers and most importantly how 
he behaved in combat.
Gentlemen at War
If prosecuting instances of dishonoured cheques highlighted an ambiguous 
divide between military discipline and private social conduct, wartime conditions 
likewise exposed a potential tension between the proper conduct of an honest 
man, who privileged financial integrity and caution, and the conduct of a good 
officer in the field, who valued bravery and boldness. Whereas officers who 
defrauded English civilians risked legal consequences and disgraceful dismissal, 
officers on active service who issued bad cheques with field cashiers or to French 
civilians faced far more lenient treatment. Commanding officers serving on the 
western front regarded financial fraud as more of an annoyance than a serious 
court martial offence. The different responses to the problem illustrated how 
119 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8692, file 332-36-52, Court Martial of Lieutenant Bowles.
120 Commenting on the social responsibilities of a commission, Desmond Morton wryly remarks an officer 
“expected his tailor and outfitter to be patient about being paid for services rendered. Gambling debts, of 
course, were a matter of honour and promptly paid.” Morton, When Your Number’s Up, p. 105.
121 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8692, file 332-36-52, Court Martial of Lieutenant Bowles.
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interpretations of gentlemanly behaviour and honourableness depended on the 
divergent disciplinary and military needs prioritized by commanding generals in 
either England or France. 
When deciding on the severity of punishment, court martial members could 
consider the character of the accused, but the personal qualities cited by defence 
witnesses were supposed to be directly related to the charge at hand in order to 
affect the finding. The Manual of Military Law pointed out, “it would be manifestly 
absurd and irrelevant” for a charge against an officer’s honesty “to allow character 
for bravery to weigh in the scale of proof.”122 Commanders serving on the frontlines 
in France avoided the problem of convicting a courageous but financially dishonest 
combat officer by usually not pursuing court martial proceedings in the field at 
all.123 The small number of charges for dishonouring cheques in France, none of 
which fell under Section 16, did not mean the problem of financial misconduct 
was any less than in England.124 Canadian Corps Headquarters in France adopted 
a more tolerant, regulatory strategy designed to retain officers and avoid legal 
complications. 
Shortly after the CEF first deployed to France in the spring of 1915, the Chief 
Paymaster, the Bank of Montreal, and the Rouen agency of Messrs. Cox & Co. 
formed an arrangement to cash Canadian officers’ cheques in the field. Cox & 
Co. required a guarantee that the cheques received in France would be honoured 
when presented to the Bank of Montreal in London, but the bank refused to grant 
overdrafts on officers’ accounts. To satisfy both institutions, the Chief Paymaster 
opened an “Officers’ Unpaid Cheque account” with the Bank of Montreal set 
at £500. When an officer had no funds to pay cheques cashed in the field, the 
bank drew money from this account to reimburse Cox & Co., who negotiated all 
cheques cashed through regimental paymasters. The Canadian Pay Office then 
deducted the amount from the officer’s pay to ensure a balance of £500 in the 
reserve account at the end of each month.125
Numerous officers abused the privilege by overdrawing their accounts with 
both the bank and the Pay Office, meaning there were often no funds to pay off 
cheques dishonoured with Cox & Co. In what came to be known as the “black 
list,” the Chief Paymaster forwarded names of habitual offenders to Cox & Co. 
and regimental paymasters, advising them not to cash the cheques of those officers 
until further notice. Attempting to restrain careless spending habits, Canadian 
Corps Headquarters instituted a policy in 1917 allowing officers serving in France 
to cash a limited number of chits, each worth 125 francs per month, with field 
paymasters. Despite these measures, many officers continued to cash cheques and 
chits in excess of the funds in their accounts.126 
122 Manual of Military Law, p. 60.
123 Of the Canadian general courts martial for dishonoured cheques, 94% occurred in England and 6% in 
France, and only two officers were dismissed for the offence in France.
124 Officers tried in the field appeared before a smaller general court martial board consisting of five senior 
officers.
125 LAC, RG 24, T-17578, file 7857-1, Militia File of Lieutenant McKay; and LAC, RG 9 III-B-1, vol. 931, 
file D-18-3-1, Adjutant-General to 2nd Echelon, France, September 26, 1917.
126 125 francs equalled a little under £5 in 1917. LAC, RG 9 III-B-1, vol. 931, file D-18-3-1, Chief Paymaster, 
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Although higher authorities called for more general courts martial in the field 
to deter violations, commanding officers in France did not recommend stronger 
disciplinary action and tended either to accept offenders’ explanations that cheques 
had been issued in good faith or limit the punishment to censuring.127 Justifying a 
light penalty against Lieutenant J. C. Andrews for issuing a bad cheque for 1,000 
francs while on leave in Paris, Major-General H. E. Burstall of the 2nd Canadian 
Division stated, he “has always been a most excellent soldier and twice decorated 
for gallantry.”128 Not only was a court martial an inconvenience and a drain on 
manpower, a guilty verdict would either result in dismissal, which might remove 
an otherwise valuable officer, or severe reprimand, which could be accomplished 
by a stern lecture from his commander.129 
Given the difficulty of even proving an officer knew the state of his bank 
account while on active service in the field made conviction far from certain. 
Instead of being subject to legal consequences, financially irresponsible officers 
on active service in France might lose several months leave and forfeit banking 
privileges. Rather than receive pay deposited in their accounts, penalized officers 
drew a restricted monthly salary through a paybook like private soldiers. By not 
recommending more severe punishment for financial misconduct in the field, many 
Canadian commanding officers appeared to echo the perspective of Lieutenant-
Colonel F. P. Crozier of the 119th (Welsh) Brigade, who had been forced to resign 
from the British Army in 1908 for dishonouring cheques:
The majority of the lads had no idea of control of their banking accounts; their 
thoughts were rightly on the line, and killing Germans; and when they got away 
for a spree, they went the whole hog. It was all wrong and unfair on them. Taking 
every case on its merits, I generally refused to allow a boy-officer to be prosecuted 
for having his cheques returned, as I felt his position was a false one, and his 
temptations such as no British boy should be subjected to.130
Many officers who dishonoured cheques had histories of financial impropriety 
but untrustworthiness in money matters did not nullify a distinguished fighting 
record. Indeed, the same impulse for risk-taking adventurism that might cause 
financial troubles in England could from the perspective of field commanders 
prove advantageous once on active service in the trenches.131 
Officer’s Unpaid Cheques, October 25, 1917.
127 LAC, RG 9 III-B-1, vol. 1235, file D-34-5, Adjutant-General to Canadian Section, 3rd Echelon, December 
8, 1917.
128 LAC, RG 9 III-B-1, vol. 931, file D-18-3-1, Major-General Burstall to Canadian Corps, November 21, 
1917.
129 LAC, MG 30-E20, R1894-0-6-E, Diary of Archibald Cameron Macdonell. Major-General Macdonell, 1st 
Canadian Division, for example, recorded in June 1918, that he “told off a number of officers re cheques.” 
The author would like to thank Bill Stewart for this reference.
130 F.P. Crozier, A Brass Hat In No Man’s Land (New York: J. Cape & H. Smith, 1930), p. 154.
131 One-third of officers removed by court martial for dishonoured cheques in England subsequently re-
enlisted in the ranks and in some cases won honours in France.
Cheque Fraud and Canadian Gentlemen Officers
328 Histoire sociale / Social History
Conclusion
Whenever an officer dishonoured a cheque, one Canadian prosecutor declared, 
“a serious blow is struck at the very foundation of the system of credit which 
has been slowly evolved for the convenience of all parties and a serious attack 
is made on the reputation of the British Army.”132 A mutually beneficial system 
of exchange depended on a creditor’s faith that every honourable client would 
guarantee payment. An officer who knowingly or carelessly overdrew his account 
by issuing worthless cheques committed a clear violation of military discipline 
because he had exploited the prestige of his uniform and commission in order 
to secure the false trust of the receiver. Officers disrespected military authority, 
legal standards, and economic principles when they failed or refused to honour 
financial transactions made with military personnel or civilians, be they bankers, 
shopkeepers, hotel owners, or on occasion female companions. The breach of 
trust disclosed an officer’s fraudulence but it also risked exposing imprudent 
personal relationships and private affairs to unwanted scrutiny. Whether used to 
pay for female companionship or to settle gambling losses, cheques sometimes 
served a grey area at the intersection of reputable and disreputable behaviours. 
Despite official repudiation of immoral vice, the army’s attempts to enforce even 
unconventional financial exchanges seemed to offer a form of legitimacy to 
certain illicit activities.
The scope of prosecutions for scandalous misbehaviour reflected distinct 
notions of acceptable gentlemanly conduct under wartime conditions. According to 
official regulations under routine orders and the Army Act, financial responsibility 
formed a key part of being considered a reputable officer; however, when 
confronting the cheque frauds committed in France, field commanders did not 
impose the same standard of financial integrity expected of officers stationed in 
England. On the battlefield, the meaning of gentlemanly honour was less dependent 
on restraint and scruples as it was based on boldness and courageousness. The 
temptation to dishonour cheques and engage in financial excess revealed the 
contradictory cultural assumptions of masculinity that ranged from a model of 
cautious prudence to one of brash risk-taking. That some officers continued to 
risk legal and disciplinary consequences by issuing worthless cheques and by 
leaving debts unpaid illustrated the fundamental tension between the financial 
expectations and social obligations that lay behind the public performance as an 
officer and a gentleman.
132 LAC, RG 150, reel T-8682, file 649-S-4068, Court Martial of Lieutenant Smith.
